Malware Hidden in Optimizely Scripts Hit Visitors of Zoom, the BBC and 176 Others
Code slipped into Optimizely Web swapped crypto addresses, skimmed some card forms and targeted older iPhones for most of 16 November. The infected scripts are now almost all clean, but how the attacker got access is still unknown.
Published 6 min read

Malicious code was served through Optimizely Web, a widely used website testing tool, to visitors of 178 organisations on 16 November 2026, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. According to security monitoring company Report URI, the script swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed card details typed into some checkout forms, stole cookies and screenshots, and tried to infect older iPhones and iPads.
Most of the code was removed by Monday evening UTC. Report URI found it in 169 infected snippets at 20:56 UTC and in only one, TalkTalk's, at 21:52 UTC. How the attacker got in is still unknown, and Optimizely had not published a statement when this article went live.
How one tool reached 178 organisations at once
Optimizely Web lets companies run A/B tests, such as showing two versions of a page to see which works better. Each customer adds a small JavaScript file, called a snippet, that loads from Optimizely's servers on every page. Inside that snippet is an optional field named Project JavaScript, where customers can add their own custom code.
The attacker wrote a short loader into that field in many unrelated customer projects. The rest of each snippet was untouched, and the file still came from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely's own security certificate. To the affected websites and their visitors' browsers, it looked like the same trusted file as always.
This is what security researchers call a supply-chain attack: the sites' own servers did not need to be breached, because a vendor they all trusted delivered the code for them. Report URI stressed that Optimizely's delivery network was not tricked into caching a fake file. It served exactly what was in the projects. Optimizely's own sites, including optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com, carried the code too.
Report URI said it does not know whether the attacker used a compromised Optimizely system, a stolen credential with access across customers, or something else. One clue suggests ongoing access: Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned and then infected again with a better-hidden version of the loader.
What the malicious script did
Every visitor received the same script, and all of its parts were active at once. What happened depended on the device and on what the visitor did on the page.
- Crypto address swapping: it looked for wallet addresses for Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin in page text, forms, links and the clipboard, and replaced them with the attacker's. Copying an address while an affected tab was open could put the attacker's address in the clipboard.
- Card skimming: from 13:43 UTC it watched forms for a card number, expiry date and security code. Cards entered in payment boxes hosted by providers such as Stripe or Adyen were out of its reach. Cards typed directly into a site's own form fields were not.
- Cookies and screenshots: when it swapped an address near wallet or payment wording, it sent the page address, readable cookies and a screenshot of the page to the attacker's server.
- iPhone and iPad exploits: on Apple mobile devices it loaded the Coruna exploit kit for iOS 13 to 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18. A separate component for iOS 26 only fingerprinted the device.
The attacker kept working on the code all day. Report URI counted 26 rebuilds of the payload on 16 November, with new features and new wallets added along the way. By 19:25 UTC, the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040 in crypto within roughly nine hours. Report URI said it cannot see how many card numbers or cookies were sent.
Timeline of the Optimizely attack (UTC)
| Time (UTC) | What happened |
|---|---|
| 17 September | The same actor's injector first appears on Turkish websites through an SEO "backlink panel" script |
| 13 to 16 November | Earlier wave through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts on sites including faz.net, smh.com.au and foxsports.com |
| 16 November, 04:21 | First Optimizely injection seen, in the BBC's snippet |
| 08:28 | Main malicious script first seen on bbc.com |
| 13:03 | Attacker moves stolen crypto to exchanges |
| 13:43 | Card skimmer added |
| 17:13 to 17:57 | iOS exploit added for devices on iOS 18.6 or earlier |
| 19:24 to 19:59 | Report URI finds 186 of 1,611 snippets it checked infected |
| 20:40 to 21:10 | Mass clean-up, including Ledger, Smartsheet and the BBC |
| 21:52 | 1 of 188 infected snippets still carries the code |
Report URI's timeline also has a Turkey connection. The same injector first appeared on Turkish websites on 17 September, two months before the Optimizely wave, delivered through a script marketed as an SEO backlink panel. Report URI did not name those sites.
Who was affected
Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets it could find and found 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations. It expects the real number to be higher. Banking and finance was the largest group with 32 organisations, followed by technology and software companies with 23, retail with 20, streaming with 12, news and media with 10 and airlines and travel with 9.
Beyond the big names above, the list includes Fox News, NPR, ASOS, Mattel, several Levi's country sites, Alaska Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, KLM, Vodafone Australia, Virgin Media O2, Change.org, UNICEF USA, PokerStars, Starbucks Canada and Lucid Motors. StepSecurity separately confirmed the chain on a GitLab page.
What to do if you visited one of these sites on 16 November
- Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. The exploit kit's own notes say those versions are patched. On iOS 18.6 or earlier, affected pages reloaded every 60 seconds as the exploit retried, which is a visible warning sign.
- Check any crypto transfer you made. If the address you pasted does not match the one you meant to pay, it may have been swapped.
- If you paid by card on an affected site, watch your statements and contact your bank about any charge you do not recognise.
What site owners should check
Report URI advises Optimizely Web customers to open every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code and look for 1688360.cc, atob( and any script they did not write. It also recommends reviewing every user, API token and integration with write access, rotating credentials and session secrets stored in cookies that scripts can read, and treating cards entered in a site's own forms on 16 November as potentially exposed.
A Content Security Policy, a browser rule list that says which servers a page may load scripts from or send data to, made a real difference. Of 256 affected hosts Report URI checked, 68 had no policy at all and only 24 organisations blocked the payload outright. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com did not help, because the code arrived from that trusted host. Settings such as 'unsafe-eval', which Optimizely's documentation tells customers to allow, let a built-in fallback copy run even where the main script was blocked.
The incident lands on a day already busy for security teams, after Anthropic cut its vulnerability disclosure window to 30 days because AI tools are finding bugs faster. Google has also warned that attackers are using AI to turn patches into working exploits, which leaves less time between a fix and an attack.